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D.C. AS A BREEDING GROUND FOR THE NEXT
SECOND AMENDMENT TEST CASE: THE
CONFLICT WITHIN THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE
Margaret E. Sprunger+
[L]et me state unequivocally my view that the text and the
original intent of the Second Amendment clearly protect the
right of individuals to keep and bear firearms.'
Since the confirmation of John Ashcroft as Attorney General,
statements like the one above and positions taken by Solicitor General
Ted Olson have spurred multiple challenges to laws restricting an
individual's right to carry a firearm, claiming that they violate the Second
Amendment.2 The current Administration's dramatic policy shift from
that of the prior Administration has re-armed advocates of individual
rights who otherwise have been fighting a losing battle outside the arena
of academia.' Particularly in the District of Columbia (D.C.), the threat
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2004, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to James Baker, Executive
Director, National Rifle Association (May 17, 2001), at
http://www.nraila.org/images/Ashcroft.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Brief for the United States in Opposition at 21 n.3, United States v.
Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002) (stating the view
of Solicitor General Ted Olsen that the Second Amendment grants the individual the right
to bear arms subject to reasonable restrictions); Brief for the United States in Opposition
at 7 n.2, United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
2632 (2002) (No. 01-8272) (stating the position of the government that the Second
Amendment grants an individual right); see also Arthur Santana & Neely Tucker, Cases
Take Aim at District's Gun Law: Attorneys Use Bush Administration's Second Amendment
Stand in Attack on Ban, WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at A20 (noting that within the first
two weeks of June, 2002, about thirty motions were filed in the D.C. Superior Court
relying on the Bush administration's stance on the Second Amendment).
3. See Letter from John Ashcroft, supra note 1. Cf Letter from Seth Waxman,
Solicitor General of the United States, to Anonymous Recipient (Aug. 22, 2000), at
http://www.rkba.org/federal/doj/waxman-emerson.html. In this letter, then-Solicitor
General Seth Waxman wrote that the Assistant United States Attorney arguing the
Emerson case was correct in asserting that only collective rights are protected under the
Second Amendment. Id. Waxman stated:
That position is consistent with the view of the Amendment taken both by the
federal appellate courts and successive Administrations. More specifically, the
Supreme Court and eight United States Courts of Appeals have considered the
scope of the Second Amendment and have uniformly rejected arguments that it
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of judicial warfare over the Second Amendment has convinced some
legal commentators that a successful constitutional challenge to the D.C.
4Code may soon be near.
With more than thirty motions to dismiss weapons charges filed in the
D.C. Superior Court since early June 2002, D.C. has become a breeding
ground for what may be the next Second Amendment test case.5
Constitutional scholars find D.C. laws susceptible to challenge for three
reasons: 1) the statutes restrict handgun ownership to law enforcement
officials only; 2) Fourteenth Amendment incorporation is inapplicable to
issues in D.C. and 3) there is conflict between the Attorney General's
statements and the D.C. Assistant U.S. Attorney's prosecution of
weapons offenses.6 As of now, D.C. Superior Court judges have denied
extends firearms rights to individuals independent of the collective need to
ensure a well-regulated militia.
Id.; see also Karen Branch-Brioso, Justice Department Footnote Marks Policy Reversal, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 12, 2002, at B1 (noting that the majority of Second
Amendment scholarship promulgates the individual-rights view, but a large percentage of
such writings were authored by Stephen Halbrook, who often served as lead lawyer on
National Rifle Association (NRA) cases against gun control); David Yassky, The Sound of
Silence: The Supreme Court and the Second Amendment-A Response to Professor Kopel,
18 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 189, 190-91 (1999) (arguing that the federal district court in
Texas relied on the views perpetrated by individual-rights scholars in deciding United
States v. Emerson); Dennis A. Henigan, Ashcroft's Bad Aim: What Is Going on with the
Justice Department and Guns?, LEGAL TIMES, Vol. 25, No. 30, July 29, 2002 (stating that
"[t]here is no doubt that Second Amendment challenges to gun laws will now become a
standard part of the criminal defense attorney's tool kit" and using, as an example, John
Walker Lindh's reliance on the policy shift in his motion to dismiss his firearms charges);
William L. McCoskey, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms Shall Not Be
Litigated Away: Constitutional Implications of Municipal Lawsuits Against the Gun
Industry, 77 IND. L.J. 873, 878 (2002) (stating that "[u]ntil fairly recently, however, many
constitutional scholars simply ignored or marginalized the Second Amendment as
relatively unimportant in the study of constitutional law.").
4. See Neely Tucker & Arthur Santana, D.C. Handgun Ban Challenged in Court:
Attorneys in 2 Cases Cite Ashcroft Stance on 2nd Amendment, WASH. POST, May 30, 2002,
at Al (stating that "the District is a logical place for the interpretation to be tested");
Robert A. Levy, Bearing Arms in D.C., LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 2002, at 42 (examining the
factors that make D.C. gun laws so ripe for constitutional challenge). See also D.C. Code
§ 22-4504(a) (2001) ("No person shall carry within the District of Columbia either openly
or concealed on or about their person, a pistol, without a license issued pursuant to
District of Columbia law, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so
concealed."); D.C. Code § 7-2502.01 (2001) (delineating the persons to which a
registration certificate may be issued, effectively restricting issuance to law enforcement
officials).
5. Santana & Tucker, supra note 2 (noting that these challenges are based on the
Bush administration's declarations that the Second Amendment grants an individual
right); see also Levy, supra note 4 (stating that under the right circumstances, a D.C.
resident could become the subject of a test case).
6. See Levy, supra note 4 (arguing that the D.C. law is particularly susceptible to
challenges because it does not fall within the "reasonable regulation" test put forth by the
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these motions to dismiss, citing binding precedent from the D.C. Court of
Appeals However, some of these defendants have filed appeals with
the appellate court, and some scholars speculate that those defendantsS8
intend to have their cases heard by the High Court.
This goal may prove to be unattainable, however, because the U.S.
Supreme Court has refused to address the Second Amendment issue
since its 1939 decision, United States v. Miller.9 In Miller-a case
inconsistently interpreted by circuit courts and legal scholars alike-the
Court held only that a "'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen
inches in length"' had no "reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia," and therefore, the right to keep
and bear such an instrument was not guaranteed by the Second
Amendment.' More recently, Second Amendment scholars on both
sides of the issue were surprised by the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari in a case that had the potential to settle the individual versus
collective rights debate."
In United States v. Emerson, the Fifth Circuit became the first circuit to
embrace the individual rights view-a view that previously thrived only
in academic circles. 2 With Emerson controlling in the Fifth Circuit, and
a split existing between the Fifth Circuit and all other circuits, the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari poses more interesting questions to
Bush Administration); see also Branch-Brioso, supra note 3 (describing the belief of some
Second Amendment scholars that the new policy will spur challenges to states with highly
restrictive gun laws, such as D.C.).
7. See Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057, 1059 (D.C. 1987) (holding that the
D.C. gun laws are constitutional on the grounds that the Second Amendment grants a
collective, not an individual, right to bear arms).
8. See, e.g. Santana & Tucker, supra note 2 (citing the belief amongst some scholars
that the denial of D.C. defendants' motions to dismiss is just the first step on the path to
the Supreme Court).
9. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). For a recent example of scholarly
analysis of the High Court's silence and of the Miller opinion, see McCoskey, supra note 3,
at 878 (stating that "the Supreme Court has been mostly and conspicuously silent on the
extent of the right . . . [and the Miller decision] did nothing to conclusively settle the
issue").
10. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
11. See, e.g., Oskar M. Prez, United States v. Emerson: The Decision That Will
Potentially Force the Supreme Court to Finally Decide Whether the Second Amendment
Protects the State or the People, 48 LOY. L. REV. 367, 383-85 (2002) (arguing that the
Supreme Court would have to decide the Second Amendment issue if it chose to hear the
Emerson case).
12. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S.
907 (2002) (splitting from the other circuits in ruling that the Second Amendment granted
an individual right to bear arms); see also Yassky, supra note 3, at 190-91 (arguing that the
federal district court in Texas relied on the views perpetrated by individual-rights scholars
in deciding Emerson).
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Second Amendment scholars.'3 What rationale lies behind the Supreme
Court's sixty years of silence? 4  What factors must the ideal Second
Amendment test case possess in order to be heard? 5 Or perhaps most
importantly, what is the likelihood that the Supreme Court will ever
decide whether the Second Amendment grants an individual or a
collective right?
6
This Comment attempts to answer those questions. It begins with a
review of the judicial interpretations of the Second Amendment
presented by the Supreme Court, the circuit courts, and the D.C. Court
of Appeals. Next, this Comment explains the positions of the Attorney
General and the Solicitor General, and compares them to the arguments
made by both the government (D.C. U.S. Attorney's Office) and the
defendants in some of the challenges now pending in the D.C. Superior
Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals. Finally, this Comment explores
the possibility that one of these challenges will reach the High Court and
explains the unlikelihood of such an outcome.
13. See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 218-20. In leading up to his own "individual rights"
view of the Second Amendment, Judge Garwood first categorizes the views of other
courts. Id. Judge Garwood categorizes the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits as
having adopted a "states' rights" or "collective rights" view, meaning that the Second
Amendment merely recognizes the right of a state to arm its militia. Id. He also indicates
that the First, Third, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a "sophisticated
collective rights model," which considers that the "'individual' right to bear arms can only
be exercised by members of a functioning, organized state militia who bear the arms while
and as a part of actively participating in the militia's activities." Id. (emphasis in original).
14. See Robert Hardaway et al., The Inconvenient Militia Clause of the Second
Amendment: Why the Supreme Court Declines to Resolve the Debate over the Right to Bear
Arms, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 41, 48-51 (2002) (hypothesizing the reasons for
the Supreme Court's silence); but see David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-Five
Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme Court Has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court has addressed the issue
both directly and indirectly in thirty-five cases since 1820).
15. See, e.g., Robert A. Levy, Will Individuals Get Their Second Amendment Rights?
The District Presents the Test Case, LEGAL TIMES, July 22, 2002 at 42 (suggesting that a
successful challenger to the D.C. law might be an otherwise responsible, law-abiding
citizen who participates in a peaceful demonstration, such as marching armed in the
nation's capital).
16. See generally Hardaway, supra note 14, at 48-51 (putting forth several possible
reasons why the Supreme Court has refused to address the issue since Miller). Cf. Kopel,
supra note 14 at 99, 123 (arguing, generally, that the Supreme Court has addressed the
Second Amendment right indirectly in thirty-five cases, and at least one Justice would
welcome a chance to settle the issue definitively); Yassky, supra note 3 (disagreeing with
Kopel's interpretation that the thirty-five cases illustrate the Court's belief that the Second
Amendment confers an individual right).
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I. BACKGROUND 7
The Second Amendment states: "A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."' 8  Although the Second
Amendment has not been repealed or changed in the more than two
centuries since its adoption, and although constitutional scholars have
vastly ignored it, within the past few decades it has become a hotly-
contested issue amidst legal scholars, politicians, other public figures, and
now, members of the " • • .9
Students of Second Amendment jurisprudence are identified as either
"individual rights" proponents or "collective rights" advocates-titles
that emerged after a William and Mary Law School student promulgated
the "individual rights" view in a 1960s law review article. 2' As common
sense dictates, the individual rights view interprets the Second
Amendment as guaranteeing individuals the right to bear arms for any
legal purpose.2' The collective rights view, on the other hand, arguably
divides into two smaller factions.22 Adopters of the "states rights" view
believe that the Second Amendment "merely" recognizes the right of a
state to arm its militia; proponents of the "sophisticated collective rights
model" recognize an individual right, but they believe that right may
"only be exercised by members of a functioning, organized state militia
17. Almost every scholarly article on the Second Amendment begins by delineating
the differences between the individual rights and collective rights theories and by giving a
full textual and historical analysis of the Amendment. See, e.g. Hardaway, supra note 14;
Prince, infra note 30; Yassky, infra note 19. This Comment provides only an overview of
these two schools of thought, partially because I believe that both arguments lack legal
validity.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
19. See David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional
Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 589 (2000) (stating, "A fierce debate about the Second
Amendment has been percolating in academia for two decades, and has now bubbled
through to the courts"); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99
YALE L.J. 637, 640 (1989) (suggesting that constitutional scholars have largely overlooked
the Second Amendment). See generally Carl T. Bogus, Symposium on the Second
Amendment: Fresh Looks: The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A
Primer, 76 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 3 (2000) (giving a history of the growing interest in the
Second Amendment).
20. Bogus, supra note 19, at 5 (crediting a student at William and Mary Law School as
the first to publicize the individual-rights theory).
21. Hardaway, supra note 14, at 56-57 (stating that "[tihe broad individual right view
pictures the Second Amendment as guaranteeing an 'individual right to bear arms for all
legal purposes - barring virtually all regulations of firearms"').
22. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 218-220 (5th Cir. 2001) (relying on
legal scholarship, Judge Garwood expounded upon the three schools of thought).
2004]
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who bear the arms while and as a part of actively participating in the
organized militia's activities."23
Both sides largely depend on a textual analysis of the Amendment.24
Individual-rights textualists interpret the Second Amendment's use of
"people" consistently with its use in the First and Fourth Amendments
which refer to individual Americans." Collective-rights theorists
arguably interpret "people," as used in the Second Amendment, as
referring to "States respectively. 2 6  "Bear Arms" is interpreted by
collective rights models as pertaining only to members of the militia
carrying weapons during militia service; alternatively, the individual
rights followers interpret it as a civilian's carrying of arms. The greatest
textual disagreement between the two sides, however, concerns the
interpretation of the preamble.28
Individual rights theorists interpret the militia clause broadly, arguing
that it refers to "the people generally possessed of arms which they knew
how to use, rather than to refer to some formal military group separate
and distinct from the people at large."' 9 Collective rights proponents, on
the other hand, interpret "militia" consistently with its use in Article I,
Section 8 and Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.30 They further
posit that the Militia Clause is not the justification for the right to bear
arms, but that the clause makes that right operative; as one writer stated,
"the existence of the right is dependent on the existence of a militia."
3
1
23. Id. at 218-19 (noting also that the government in Emerson relied on the states'
rights view).
24. See discussion infra Part I.
25. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227-28 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259 (1990)). According to the Verdugo-Urquidez Court, "the people" "refers to a
class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community."
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
26. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227 (arguing, however, that "[t]his would also require a
corresponding change in the balance of the text ... [t]hat is not only far removed from the
actual wording.., but also would be in substantial tension with Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 16").
27. Id. at 229 (stating, however, that "[t]here is no question that the phrase 'bear
arms' may be used to refer to the carrying of arms by a soldier or militiaman").
28. See discussion infra Part I; see also, Kopel, supra note 14 at 110.
29. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 235 (relying on Madison and his Federalist Papers to
support this view).
30. See, e.g., John Randolph Prince, The Naked Emperor: The Second Amendment
and the Failure of Originalism, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 659, 713-14 (2002). Prince argues that
"the militia [did] not consist of self-selected groups of armed citizens challenging
authority. Rather, the militia was subject to the orders and discipline of both state and
federal authority." Id. at 714
31. Hardaway, supra note 14, at 133 (disagreeing with the Emerson court's view that
"'the right exists independent of the existence of the militia"').
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In addition to textual considerations, analysts also rely on historical
context or their interpretations of the Framers' intent.32 Both sides
generally acknowledge that the Constitution's protection of the militia
was the Anti-Federalists' response to fears that the federal government
would use its standing army to oppress the American people.33
However, individual rights advocates argue that a review of the
legislative history of the ratification of the Second Amendment and
newspaper articles and personal letters written at the time illustrate that:
The Second Amendment's preamble represents a successful
attempt, by the Federalists, to further pacify moderate Anti-
Federalists without actually conceding any additional ground,
i.e. without limiting the power of the federal government to
maintain a standing army or increasing the power of the states
over the militia .... [There is] no historical evidence that the
Second Amendment was intended to convey militia powers to
the states, limit the federal government's power to maintain a
standing army, or a~plies only to members of a select militia
while on active duty.
The collective-rights theorists contend, however, that "[g]iven the
ratification context from which these clauses came, it should be
noncontroversial that the proposal did not embody a right to the private,
non-militia possession of arms., 35 Although these textual and historical
arguments were largely proliferated in law review articles, they or their
presence has recently been noted in judicial opinions.36
32. See Prince, supra note 30, at 662 ("Nearly everyone who is involved with Second
Amendment scholarship . . .uses an originalist perspective, relying heavily on various
readings of eighteenth-century republican ideology.").
33. See, e.g., Emerson, 270 F.3d at 238-39. The Anti-Federalists feared that the
federal government would act or fail to act so as to destroy the militia, e.g., failure to arm
the militia, disarmament of the militia, failure to prescribe training for the militia, creation
of a select militia or making militia service so unpleasant that the people would demand a
standing army or select militia. These concerns over the militia were exacerbated by the
third issue: the federal government's power to maintain a standing army (art. I, § 8, cl. 12).
The Anti-Federalists feared that the federal government's standing army could be used to
tyrannize and oppress the American people. Without a militia to defend against the
federal government's standing army, the states and their citizens would be defenseless.
Id. at 237-39.
34. Id. at 259-60 (arguing that "[aill of the evidence indicates that the Second
Amendment, like other parts of the Bill of Rights, applies to and protects individual
Americans").
35. Hardaway, supra note 14, at 94-95. Hardaway reviewed the modifications made
to the Second Amendment and argued that each change strengthened "the militia
orientation of the Amendment."
36. See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) (incorporating a
discussion regarding the textual and historical analysis of the Second Amendment).
2004]
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. The Supreme Court's Approach and Why It Has Caused So Much
Confusion
1. The Stepping-Stone for Debate: United States v. Miller37
It is generally accepted that Miller is the only twentieth century case in
which the Supreme Court directly addressed the Second Amendment."
Miller came before the Court as a challenge to Jack Miller's indictment
for "unlawfully, knowingly, willfully, and feloniously transport[ing] in
interstate commerce ... a double barrel 12-gauge Stevens shotgun having
a barrel less than 18 inches in length" in violation of the National
Firearms Act (the Act). 9 The District Court of Kansas held that Section
11 of the Act violated the Second Amendment.4" The Supreme Court
reversed, stating:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession
or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches
in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot
say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep
and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial
notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military
equipment or that its use could contribute to the common
defense.4'
In its analysis, the Court began by exploring the Framers' purpose for
including the militia clause in the Second Amendment. 42  Addressing
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which grants to Congress the
37. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
38. See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 14 (suggesting that there are nineteen other twentieth
century cases from which the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Second Amendment
can be inferred).
39. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
40. 48 Stat. 1239 (1934). The statute states:
It shall be unlawful for any person who is required to register as provided in
section 5 hereof and who shall not have so registered, or any other person who
has not in his possession a stamp-affixed order as provided in section 4 hereof, to
ship, carry, or deliver any firearm in interstate commerce.
Id. § 11; see also United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Ark. 1939).
41. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (1939); see also Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65, n.8
(1980) (quoting the same passage and stating that the "legislative restrictions on the use of
firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon
any constitutionally protected liberties").
42. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-82. The Court pointed out that the importance of "militia"
derives from colonial history, and early discussions surrounding the development of the
Constitution. Id. at 179.
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power to call forth the militia, the Court stated: "With obvious purpose
to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such
forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were
made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view., 43 This
seemingly straightforward language has resulted in differing
interpretations among the lower courts, begging the question of whether
the Supreme Court will address the Second Amendment issue in the near
future. 44
2. A Prediction for the Future: Printz v. United States
Some legal commentators have argued that the Second Amendment
was addressed by the Supreme Court in Printz v. United States.46 In
Printz, the Court held that part of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act (Brady Act) was unconstitutional because it forced state
and local law enforcement officers to perform an essentially federal
function, federal background checks on handgun purchasers.47 Although
the Court based its decision on the Commerce Clause and did not
significantly address the Second Amendment issue, Justice Thomas'
concurring opinion suggested that a grant of certiorari to a Second
Amendment case may not be far off.48 He stated:
The Second Amendment similarly appears to contain an
express limitation on the Government's authority . . . . This
Court has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of the
substantive right safeguarded by the Second Amendment. If,
however, the Second Amendment is read to confer a personal
right to "keep and bear arms," a colorable argument exists that
the Federal Government's regulatory scheme, at least as it
pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms,
runs afoul of that Amendment's protections .... Perhaps, at
some future date, this Court will have the opportunity to
determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that
43. Id. at 178.
44. See discussion infra Part II.B.
45. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
46. Kopel, supra note 14, at 121-24 (arguing that Justice Thomas's concurring opinion
suggests that this Court would welcome the opportunity to decide definitively whether the
right to bear arms is an individual or collective right).
47. 521 U.S. 898; see also Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
48. Printz, 521 U.S. at 937-39 (Thomas, J., concurring) (opining that perhaps the
Court would someday have the opportunity to determine whether the Second
Amendment grants an individual or collective right); see also Kopel, supra note 14, at 120-
25 (using Thomas's concurring opinion to assess the likelihood that the Supreme Court
will finally put an end to the Second Amendment debate).
20041
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the right to bear arms "has justly been considered, as the
palladium of the liberties of a republic.4 9
Perhaps this statement by Justice Thomas was unnecessary in the context
of the case in which it was written; nonetheless, it illustrates at least one
Justice's view that Miller was not dispositive on the Second Amendment
* 50issue.
B. Within the Circuits-The Trickle-Down Effect
1. The First Circuit's Interpretation: Cases v. United States"
In Cases, the defendant appealed his conviction by the District Court
of the United States for Puerto Rico for transporting and receiving a
52firearm with ammunition. The defendant alleged that the Federal
13Firearms Act was an unconstitutional violation of his right to bear arms.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding no14
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. In regard to the
Second Amendment, the court stated:
The right to keep and bear arms is not a right conferred upon
the people by the federal constitution. Whatever rights in this
respect the people may have depend upon local legislation; the
only function of the Second Amendment being to prevent the
federal government and the federal government only from
infringing that right.55
In interpreting Miller, however, the Cases court adopted the proposition
that the Second Amendment only addresses the types of weapons that
may be possessed; specifically, it noted that the possession of those
weapons that reasonably relate to the preservation of a well-regulated
56
militia may avoid regulation by the federal government. Yet, the Cases
court quickly pointed out its belief that, in Miller, the Supreme Court was
49. Printz, 521 U.S. at 937-39 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
50. Kopel, supra note 14, at 120-25.
51. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942).
52. Id. at 919. See also Federal Firearms Act, 52 Stat. 1250 (1942) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 902(e),(f) (2002)) making it a criminal offense for any person convicted of a
violent crime to receive a firearm).
53. Cases, 131 F.2d at 919 (reiterating defendant's contention as to the Federal
Firearms Act unconstitutionality).
54. Id. at 919 (finding that none of the defendant's contentions were sound).
55. Id. at 921 (noting, additionally, that the Act "undoubtedly curtails to some extent
the right of individuals to keep and bear arms but it does not follow from this as a
necessary consequence that it is bad under the Second Amendment").
56. Id. at 922 (interpreting Miller to mean that "under the Second Amendment, the
federal government can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single individual ...
but it cannot prohibit the possession or use of any weapon which has any reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia").
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The Next Second Amendment Test
not delineating a fail-safe rule to apply in all Second Amendment cases,
but instead merely addressed the specific facts of that case. 7 The Cases
court further stated that such a rule may have already become outdated,
even though only three and a half years had passed between Miller and
Cases, because of advancements in lethal weaponry and the frequency of
certain "Commando Units" in employing such weaponry: 8 Thus, the
Cases court suggested a more flexible interpretation of Miller, advocating
for case-by-case determination of what constitutes a valid restriction
under the Second Amendment. 9
2. Clarifying the Militia-Relationship Requirement: United States v.
Tot""
Like the First Circuit, the Third Circuit in United States v. Tot
acknowledged that the Second Amendment was adopted to protect the
states' rights to organize and maintain militias.6 ' The defendant in Tot
was convicted under the Federal Firearms Act when law enforcement
found a .32 caliber Colt automatic pistol during his arrest and their
62
search of his home. The defendant contended that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to that type of weapon.63 In response, the
57. Id. (refusing to extend the holding in this case beyond what was necessary to
resolve it).
58. Id. (suggesting that interpreting Miller as an absolute rule has little practical value
in modern application). The court reasoned that, "under present day conditions, the
federal government would be empowered only to regulate the possession or use of
weapons such as a flintlock musket or a matchlock harquebus." Id.
59. Id.
Considering the many variable factors bearing upon the question it seems to us
impossible to formulate any general test by which to determine the limits imposed by
the Second Amendment but that each case under it, like cases under the Due Process
Clause, must be decided on its own facts and the line between what is and what is not
a valid federal restriction pricked out by decided cases falling on one side or the other
of the line.
Id.
60. 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942).
61. Id. at 266.
It is abundantly clear both from the discussions of this amendment
contemporaneous with its proposal and adoption and those of learned writers
since that this amendment, unlike those providing for protection of free speech
and freedom of religion, was not adopted with individual rights in mind, but as a
protection for the States in the maintenance of their militia organizations against
possible encroachments by the federal power.
Id.
62. Id. at 263; see also Federal Firearms Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 901(f) (1938) (making it
unlawful "to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce" if a person has been convicted of a violent crime).
63. Id. at 266.
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court summarized its interpretation of the common law view on the right
to bear weapons and of the Framers' intent for including the Second
Amendment in the Constitution.64 The Third Circuit then found that the
defendant failed to show that his possession of the pistol bore any
reasonable relationship to the "preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia," as required by Miller.65  The Third Circuit then
affirmed Tot's conviction, stating that "[t]he contention of the appellant
in this case could, we think, be denied without more under the authority
of United States v. Miller." 66 The court also noted that restricting mental
patients, young children, and criminals from possessing weapons was
reasonable.
3. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits Fall in Line: Love v. Pepersack 67 and
United States v. Hale6'
The Fourth Circuit adopted the militia-relationship requirement in
Love v. Pepersack.69 April Love brought a civil suit against members of
the Maryland State Police Department because it denied her application
to purchase a handgun based upon her having a record of prior arrests."
64. Id. "Weapon bearing was never treated as anything like an absolute right by the
common law. It was regulated by statute as to time and place as far back as the Statute of
Northampton in 1328 and on many occasions since." Id. "The experiences in England
under James II of an armed royal force quartered upon a defenseless citizenry was fresh in
the minds of the Colonists. They wanted no repetition of that experience in their newly
formed government." Id.
65. Id.
The [Miller] Court said that in the absence of evidence tending to show that
possession of such a gun at the time has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, it could not be said that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep such an instrument. The
appellant here having failed to show such a relationship, the same thing may be
said as applied to the pistol found in his possession.
Id.
66. Id. Here the court relied on early state constitutions that prohibited people from
bearing arms in public places and carrying concealed weapons. Id. The court then argued
that such classifications did not prevent the maintenance of the militia. Id. at 266-67.
67. 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995).
68. 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992).
69. Love, 47 F.3d at 124 ("Since [Miller], the lower federal courts have uniformly held
that the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual, right."
70. Id. at 122. Love attempted to purchase a handgun in 1990. Id. Following state
law, she completed her application honestly and correctly. Id. Upon review of the
application, police discovered that Ms. Love had four prior arrests. Id. Despite only one
of the arrests resulting in a misdemeanor conviction, the application was denied. Id. The
state court ordered the police to approve the application because prior arrests were not
listed as one of the grounds for denial under the Maryland Code. Id. Love then filed a
new suit alleging that the statute violated due process and the Second Amendment; the
suit was dismissed and Love appealed. Id.
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Love argued that Maryland infringed her constitutional right to keep and
bear a handgun, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.'
The court stated, "even as against federal regulation, the amendment
does not confer an absolute individual right to bear any type of
firearm. 7 1 Interpreting the Miller decision as requiring that the
possessor bear some relationship to a well-regulated militia, the court
held that Love failed to prove how her possession of a handgun would
"preserve or insure the effectiveness of the militia.7 3
The Eighth Circuit followed suit, adopting the militia requirement in
United States v. Hale. 4 Convicted on thirteen counts of possession of a
machine gun and three counts of possession of unregistered firearms,
Wilbur Hale appealed on the grounds that his indictment violated his
Second Amendment rights. 71 Relying on the "type of weapon"
interpretation of Miller, Hale argued that the types of weapons seized
from him were common to military use, and thus related to a well-
76regulated militia. The court disagreed, stating that it could not
"conclude that the Second Amendment protects the individual
possession of military weapons."77 Elaborating on its interpretation of
71. Id. at 123. Relying on scholarly material, Love argued that she had a
constitutional right to own a firearm and the state law had no authority to deny her that
right. Id. The Court disagreed. Id.
72. Id. at 124.
73. Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974) as precedent for
the proposition that the defendant bears the burden of proving how his or her possession
of a handgun ensures the effectiveness of the militia).
74. United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992)(stating that "[t]he
purpose of the Second Amendment is to restrain the federal government from regulating
the possession of arms where such regulation would interfere with the preservation or
efficiency of the militia").
75. Id. at 1017-18. Relying on Miller, Hale argued "that the Second Amendment bars
the federal government from regulating the particular weapons seized because the
weapons are susceptible to military use and are therefore, by definition, related to the
existence of 'a well regulated militia."' Id; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(2002); 26 U.S.C. §
5861(d)(2000).
76. Hale, 978 F.2d at 1018.
These [weapons seized] included one MAC-10.45 caliber submachine gun, three
"Sten-type" 9 millimeter fully automatic submachine guns, two M-1 carbines
with kits for enabling fully automatic fire, one .22 caliber pistol with a silencer,
and five .223 caliber assault rifles modified into "M-16 type" fully automatic
machine guns. The agents also seized the principal components or "receivers" of
one MAC-10, one Sten, and one "M-16 type" machine gun.
Id. at 1017.
77. Id. at 1019 (relying largely on the Cases opinion). The Court stated:
[T]he claimant of Second Amendment protection must prove that his or her
possession of the weapons was reasonably related to a well regulated militia.
Where such a claimant presented no evidence either that he was a member of a
military organization or that his use of the weapon was "in preparation for a
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Miller, the court stated, "Miller simply 'did not hold .. that the Second
Amendment is an absolute prohibition against all regulation of the
manufacture, transfer and possession of any instrument capable of being
used in military action.' 78 By adopting the individual case approach set
forth in Cases, the court concluded that Hale's possession of the weapons
was not reasonably related to preservation of a militia.79  Finally, the
court noted that there was no need, in this case, to determine, as the
defendant argued, whether the Second Amendment grants an individual
or a collective right."80
4. The Sixth Circuit's Strict Definition of "Militia" in United States v.
Warin "'
United States v. Warin reflects the Sixth Circuit's determination of
whether amendments to the National Firearms Act violated the Second
Amendment."' In Warin, the defendant was convicted for knowingly
possessing an unregistered submachine gun.83 Warin was an active
member of the sedentary militia of Ohio and worked for a company that
developed firearms for the government. The defendant made the
military career," the Second Amendment did not protect the possession of the
weapon.
Id. at 1020 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 1019 (citing United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d. 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976)). The
court further stated that the "rule emerging from Miller is that, absent a showing that the
possession of a certain weapon has 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well-regulated militia,' the Second Amendment does not guarantee the
right to possess the weapon." Id.
79. Id. at 1020. The court stated that because the Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue since 1939, the Cases decision "remains one of the most illuminating circuit
opinions on the subject of 'military' weapons and the Second Amendment." Id. at 1019.
The court further noted that, since Miller, no federal court had found that a defendant's
possession of a weapon met the militia-relation requirement. Id. at 1020. "'Technical'
membership in a state militia (e.g., membership in an 'unorganized' state militia) or
membership in a non-governmental military organization is not sufficient to satisfy the
'reasonable relationship' test. Membership in a hypothetical or 'sedentary' militia is
likewise insufficient." Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 1020 ("Whether the 'right to bear arms' for militia purposes is 'individual'
or 'collective' in nature is irrelevant where, as here, the individual's possession of arms is
not related to the preservation or efficiency of a militia.").
81. Warin, 530 F.2d 103.
82. Id.; see, e.g., Gun Control Act of 1968, 26 U.S.C. § 5801 (2000).
83. Warin, 530 F.2d at 104 (describing the weapon as "a 9 mm prototype submachine
gun measuring approximately 21 inches overall length, with a barrel length of
approximately 7 1/2 inches, which had not been registered to him in the National Firearms
Registration and Transfer Record as required").
84. Id. at 105.
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weapon at issue, which was a type used for military purposes." Warin,
therefore, argued that his case differed from the facts of Miller, because
both he and the weapon he possessed were reasonably related to a well-
regulated militia." However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed and affirmed his conviction.87 The Warin court followed the
First Circuit decision in Cases, which held that Miller did not set forth a
general rule, but was specific to the facts of Miller's case 8 The court,
therefore, considered the facts before it and concluded that the Second
Amendment granted a collective right to bear arms.8 9 Additionally, the
court found that the possession of arms must at the present time bear
some reasonable relationship to the preservation of a well-regulated
militia.90 Finding that Warin was only a member of a "sedentary militia,"
the court held that the Second Amendment did not protect him.91
85. Id. Both sides stipulated the following facts: 1) The armed forces of the United
States use machine guns; 2) this particular type of gun contributes to the United States'
armed forces ability to successfully protect and efficiently defend the country; 3)
submachine guns comprise part of the United States equipment and this type of firearm
reasonably relates to the effectiveness of the armed forces. Id.
86. Id. Warin argued that Miller implied that "a member of the 'sedentary militia'
may possess any weapon having military capability" and application of the Gun Control
Act to him was therefore unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Id. at 105.
87. Id. at 103.
In Miller the Supreme Court did not reach the question of the extent to which a
weapon which is "part of the ordinary military equipment" or whose "use could
contribute to the common defense" may be regulated. In holding that the
absence of evidence placing the weapon involved in the charges against Miller in
one of these categories precluded the trial court from quashing the indictment on
Second Amendment grounds, the Court did not hold the converse-that the
Second Amendment is an absolute prohibition against all regulation of the
manufacture, transfer and possession of any instrument capable of being used in
military action.
Id. at 105-06.
88. Id. at 106 (reiterating the First Circuit's reasoning that "it was not the intention of
the Supreme Court to hold that the Second Amendment prohibits Congress from
regulating any weapons except antiques 'such as a flintlock musket or a matchlock
harquebus"'). "If the logical extension of the defendant's argument for the holding of
Miller was inconceivable in 1942, it is completely irrational in this time of nuclear
weapons." Id.
89. Id. at 106.
90. Id. (relying on prior precedent from the Sixth Circuit, as well as persuasive
jurisprudence from sister circuits).
91. Id. at 106-07 (emphasizing that simply because Warin was eligible to enroll in the
state militia, he did not automatically have the authority to possess a submachine gun).
The court further noted that a state statute exempted members of the organized militia
from a provision prohibiting all persons from acquiring, possessing, carrying, or using a
"dangerous ordnance" (including automatic firearms), but that exemption did not extend
to members of the "sedentary militia." Id. Finally, the court opined that there was no
evidence "that a submachine gun in the hands of an individual 'sedentary militia' member
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5. The Fifth Circuit Upsets the Balance: United States v. Emerson 92
Despite the varying interpretations of Miller followed by each circuit,
it was generally accepted that the right to bear arms was a collective
right, not an individual one.9' With the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Emerson, however, that general statement is no longer true. 94 In
Emerson, the defendant was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8)(C)(ii), which makes it a crime for a person under a restraining
order to possess or transport firearms or ammunition. 9 Emerson's wife
filed a petition for divorce and for a temporary injunction, and the judge
granted the injunction.6 Subsequently, a grand jury indicted Emerson
for unlawfully possessing a firearm while subject to a restraining order, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(c)(ii). 9 The district court dismissed the
indictment, finding the statute unconstitutional because it stripped
Emerson of his right to bear arms under the Second Amendment without
first establishing his criminal status.99
would have any, much less a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia."' Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
92. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
93. See discussion supra Part IIB.
94. See Perez, supra note 11, at 368 (stating that unlike many other court decisions
that support the collective rights model, Emerson analyzes the Second Amendment issue
in great detail and concludes that the Amendment permits an individual right to bear
arms).
95. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 210; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000). The statute states
in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... who is subject to a court order that...
restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner
... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
Id.
96. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 210-11. Emerson's wife filed a petition for divorce,
requesting inter alia a temporary injunction prohibiting Emerson from engaging in twenty-
nine specified acts. Id. After a hearing, in which Emerson appeared pro se, the judge
issued the temporary order. Id.
97. Id. at 211-12. The count alleged that Emerson "unlawfully possessed 'in and
affecting interstate commerce' a firearm, a Beretta pistol, while subject to the [restraining
order]." Id. at 212. Emerson moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the
statute violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him. Id.
98. United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611 (N.D.Tex. 1999). Judge
Cummings's opinion included a lengthy discussion on the two schools of Second
Amendment scholarship, a textual analysis of the Second Amendment, a historical
analysis, a structural analysis, judicial interpretations, and prudential concerns regarding
the Second Amendment, before concluding that the Second Amendment protects an
individual's right to bear arms. Id. at 599-610. Judge Cummings explicitly stated, "The
rights of the Second Amendment should be as zealously guarded as the other individual
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case;
however, it spent considerable effort discussing the history, textual
analysis, and judicial interpretation of the Second Amendment." This
analysis led the Fifth Circuit to conclude that: 1) Miller does not support
a collective rights model; 2) the text of the Second Amendment does not
suggest a collective rights model; and 3) no historical evidence supports
the argument that the Second Amendment was intended only to convey
militia powers to the states; therefore, the Second Amendment was
meant to protect the rights of individual Americans.' °° However, the
court recognized that a citizen's right to bear arms may be limited by
such factors as felony convictions or a determination of unsound mind.' °'
liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Id. at 610. Therefore, in finding § 922(g)(8)
unconstitutional, Judge Cummings stated:
Under this statute, a person can lose his Second Amendment rights not because
he has committed some wrong in the past, or because a judge finds he may
commit some crime in the future, but merely because he is in a divorce
proceeding. Although he may not be a criminal at all, he is stripped of his right
to bear arms as much as a convicted felon. Second Amendment rights should not
be so easily abridged.
Id. at 611; see also Stephen P. Halbrook, Rewriting the Second Amendment, AMERICAN
HUNTER, Oct. 1, 2001 (stating that "Judge Cummings' opinion is unequaled in its
scholarship and analysis of federal jurisprudence concerning the Second Amendment" and
praising the decision as "the only decision squarely to face the music-the text of the
Second Amendment, the Framers' intent, and the relevant U.S. Supreme Court
decisions").
99. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 210, 227-59. For views arguing that Judge Garwood's
opinion overstepped its bounds, see Emerson, 270 F.3d at 272 (Parker, J., specially
concurring) (labeling the majority's discussion of the Second Amendment "84 pages of
dicta" and refusing to concur with that portion of the decision); John Council, Ammo for
Both Sides in Gun Case, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001 (quoting one scholar's belief that the
opinion lacks judicial restraint because "federal courts are not permitted to give advisory
opinions, and that's what they've done on the issue of whether there is an individual right
or a collective right in the Second Amendment").
100. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 226, 233, 260. After analyzing the opinion, the court
concluded that Miller neither supported a collective rights approach nor an individual
rights view, therefore "Miller itself does not resolve that issue." Id. at 226-27. The court
then diagramed the text of the Amendment, examining the terms "people," "bear arms,"
"keep ... arms," and the effect of the preamble. Id. at 227-36. It found that the collective-
rights proponents tortured their meanings in a manner "inconsistent with the substantive
guarantee's text, its placement within the bill of rights and the wording of the other articles
thereof and of the original Constitution as a whole." Id. at 236. Additionally, the court
reviewed the history of the Amendment, including the Anti-Federalists' fears, the
Federalist response, the legislative history, and nineteenth century commentary, before
concluding "that the Second Amendment, like other parts of the Bill of Rights, applies to
and protects individual Americans." Id. at 259-60.
101. Id. at 261 ("As we have previously noted, it is clear that felons, infants and those
of unsound mind may be prohibited from possessing firearms.").
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The court then concluded that the statute reasonably excluded persons
subjected to restraining orders."2
C. Within D.C. -An Unmovable Barrier?
1. Setting Precedent: Sandidge v. United States'03
Precedent binds the D.C. Superior Court to the D.C. Court of
Appeals' interpretation of the Second Amendment in Sandidge v. United
States. 4  Lee Sandidge appealed his conviction for carrying an
unlicensed pistol, possessing an unregistered firearm, and unlawfully
possessing ammunition, on the sole ground that the D.C. firearms
statutes violated his constitutional right to keep and bear arms.' °5 The
102. Id. at 264. The court found that "Emerson actually posed a credible threat to the
physical safety of his wife, and... [he] could, consistent with the Second Amendment, be
precluded from possessing a firearm while he remained subject to the order." Id. at 261.
103. Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057 (D.C. App. 1987).
104. Id. at 1058 (agreeing with the Cases court that the Constitution does not grant the
right to bear arms; the state governments confer such rights).
105. Id. at 1057 (noting that Sandidge was convicted by a jury for violating D.C. Code
§ 22-3204 (1981), § 6-2311 (1981), and § 6-2361 (1981)); see also D.C. Code § 22-3204
(1981) (current version at D.C. Code § 22-4504 (2001)). This statute states:
Carrying concealed weapons; possession of weapons during commission of crime
of violence; penalty.
(a) No person shall carry within the District of Columbia either openly or
concealed on or about their person, a pistol, without a license issued pursuant to
District of Columbia law, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so
concealed. Whoever violates this section shall be punished as provided in § 22-
4515, except that:
(1) A person who violates this section by carrying a pistol, without a license
issued pursuant to District of Columbia law, or any deadly or dangerous weapon,
in a place other than the person's dwelling place, place of business, or on other
land possessed by the person, shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned
for not more than 5 years, or both; or
(2) If the violation of this section occurs after a person has been convicted in the
District of Columbia of a violation of this section or of a felony, either in the
District of Columbia or another jurisdiction, the person shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
Id.; D.C. Code § 6-2311 (1981) (current version at D.C. Code § 7-2502.01 (2002)). This
statute states:
Registration requirements. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this unit, no
person or organization in the District of Columbia ("District") shall receive,
possess, control, transfer, offer for sale, sell, give, or deliver any destructive
device, and no person or organization in the District shall possess or control any
firearm, unless the person or organization holds a valid registration certificate for
the firearm. A registration certificate may be issued: (1) To an organization if:
(A) The organization employs at least 1 commissioned special police officer or
employee licensed to carry a firearm whom the organization arms during the
employee's duty hours; and (B) The registration is issued in the name of the
organization and in the name of the president or chief executive officer of the
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D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, finding no Second
Amendment violation."6 The Sandidge court left no room for
misinterpretation; it aligned itself with other courts that have interpreted
only a collective right under the Second Amendment. °7
The Sandidge court expressly rejected the argument that, under Miller,
Congress may only regulate classes of weapons that are unrelated to the
militia. )0 Instead, the court interpreted Miller as the Supreme Court's
organization; (2) In the discretion of the Chief of Police, to a police officer who
has retired from the Metropolitan Police Department; or (3) In the discretion of
the Chief of Police, to the Fire Marshal and any member of the Fire and Arson
Investigation Unit of the Fire Prevention Bureau of the Fire Department of the
District of Columbia, who is designated in writing by the Fire Chief, for the
purpose of enforcing the arson and fire safety laws of the District of Columbia.
(b) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to: (1) Any law enforcement
officer or agent of the District or the United States, or any law enforcement
officer or agent of the government of any state or subdivision thereof, or any
member of the armed forces of the United States, the National Guard or
organized reserves, when such officer, agent, or member is authorized to possess
such a firearm or device while on duty in the performance of official authorized
functions; (2) Any person holding a dealer's license; provided, that the firearm or
destructive device is: (A) Acquired by such person in the normal conduct of
business; (B) Kept at the place described in the dealer's license; and (C) Not kept
for such person's private use or protection, or for the protection of his business;
(3) With respect to firearms, any nonresident of the District participating in any
lawful recreational firearm-related activity in the District, or on his way to or
from such activity in another jurisdiction; provided, that such person, whenever
in possession of a firearm, shall upon demand of any member of the
Metropolitan Police Department, or other bona fide law enforcement officer,
exhibit proof that he is on his way to or from such activity, and that his
possession or control of such firearm is lawful in the jurisdiction in which he
resides; provided further, that such weapon shall be unloaded, securely wrapped,
and carried in open view.
Id.; D.C. Code § 6-2361 (1981) (current version at D.C. Code § 7-2506.01 (2001)). This
statute states:
Persons permitted to possess ammunition. No person shall possess ammunition
in the District of Columbia unless:
(1) He is a licensed dealer pursuant to subchapter IV of this unit; (2) He is an
officer, agent, or employee of the District of Columbia or the United States of
America, on duty and acting within the scope of his duties when possessing such
ammunition; (3) He is the holder of the valid registration certificate for a firearm
of the same gauge or caliber as the ammunition he possesses; except, that no such
person shall possess restricted pistol bullets; or (4) He holds an ammunition
collector's certificate on September 24, 1976.
Id.
106. Sandidge, 520 A.2d at 1058.
107. Id. (stating that the Second Amendment "protects a state's right to raise and
regulate a militia by prohibiting Congress from enacting legislation that will interfere with
that right").
108. Id. (noting that Sandidge's reliance on Miller was "misplaced" and adopting the
interpretation of the Cases court, which held that Miller did not set forth a general rule).
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declaration that the Second Amendment only protects a state's (or the
District of Columbia's) right to raise and regulate a militia; it does not
restrict Congress or local governments from regulating the use and
possession of weapons that are not related to such a militia."'9
2. Ashcroft vs. His Assistants
There are currently a number of defendants in D.C. seeking to
overturn Sandidge."0 In June 2002, for example, Michael Freeman
unsuccessfully challenged his indictment for carrying a pistol without a
license, possession of an unregistered firearm, and unlawful possession of
ammunition, as violations of the Second Amendment. " ' Primarily,
Freeman argued that the statutes had the effect of permitting only law
enforcement officers to register firearms, thereby denying the average
D.C. citizen the right to bear arms. ' 2 Freeman relied on the decision in
Emerson, the position taken by the Solicitor General in opposition to the
petition for certiorari in Emerson, and the memorandum endorsing
Emerson sent by Attorney General John Ashcroft to every U.S.
Attorneys' Office." 
3
109. Id. at 1059 (holding that Sandidge was unable to show that his possession of a
handgun related to D.C.'s preservation of a militia).
110. See Tucker & Santana, D.C. Handgun Ban Challenge, supra note 4 (stating that
"two D.C. defendants are likely to be the first of many to ... make constitutional
challenges to the city's handgun ban"); Neely Tucker and Arthur Santana, U.S. Backs
District Gun Law in Court: Argument Differs from Ashcrofts, WASH. POST, May 31, 2002
(discussing the "first of at least three cases that challenge the District's prohibition on
handguns as unconstitutional"); Santana & Tucker, supra note 2 (noting that thirty
motions were filed in the D.C. Superior Court in June of 2002, to dismiss gun-carrying
charges); Levy, supra note 4 (discussing the cases already before the D.C. courts);
Editorial, Guns and Ideology, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2002 (analyzing one of these
challenges).
111. United States v. Freeman, No. F-1048-02 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 11, 2002) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of preexisting precedent in
D.C.).
112. Id.
113. See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 19 n.3, United States v. Emerson,
270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002). The Solicitor General
stated:
The current position of the United States ... is that the Second Amendment
more broadly protects the rights of individuals, including persons who are not
members of any militia or engaged in active military service or training, to
possess and bear their own firearms, subject to reasonable restrictions designed
to prevent possession by unfit persons or to restrict the possession of types of
firearms that are particularly suited to criminal misuse.
Id.; see also United States v. Freeman, No. F-1048-02 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 11, 2002)
(order denying defendant's motion to dismiss); Branch-Brioso, supra note 3 (describing
the memo Ashcroft sent to every U.S. Attorney, "notifying them they should contact
headquarters in 'all cases in which Second Amendment issues are raised' and quoting a
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In a letter to the National Rifle Association (NRA), Ashcroft wrote,
"[1let me state unequivocally my view that the text and the original intent
of the Second Amendment clearly protect the right of individuals to keep
and bear firearms.' '1 4 Ashcroft's position relies on the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, which noted that the use
of the words "the people," as used throughout the Bill of Rights, secures
rights to the individual, and relies on this interpretation as revealing the
intent of the Founding Fathers. "5 Ashcroft also authored a well-
publicized memorandum to all attorneys in the Department of Justice
describing further the government's policy shift." 6 These actions have
Brady Center attorney's view that the memo "is basically a gift to criminals"); Henigan,
supra note 3 (describing the "quandary Ashcroft has created for federal prosecutors").
Henigan states:
For example, in proceedings in United States v. Freeman ... the government did
cite the controlling legal authority in the District . . . . In doing so, however,
prosecutors explained that this authority "contains reasoning that is inconsistent
with the position of the United States as to the scope of the Second
Amendment," noting that they were, nevertheless, ethically obligated "to point
the Court to controlling legal authority known 'to be dispositive of a question at
issue.'
Id.
114. Letter from John Ashcroft, supra note 1. For an example of the public outcry that
followed this letter, see Henigan, supra note 3 (describing the letter as an "extrajudicial
statement ... to an opposing amicus party in a pending case, stating that he agreed with
that party's interpretation," and commenting on the ethics complaints filed with the
Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility against Ashcroft by Common
Cause and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence).
115. Letter from John Ashcroft, supra note 1 (stating his belief that "the Amendment's
plain meaning and original intent prove [that]... [lhike the First and Fourth Amendments,
the Second Amendment protects the rights of 'the people' . . . This view of the text
comports with the all but unanimous understanding of the Founding Fathers"); see also
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (plurality opinion) (stating
that "the people" has the same meaning throughout the Bill of Rights).
116. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Department Backs Individuals' Right to Bear
Arms, HOUS. CHRON., May 8, 2002 (quoting from Ashcroft's letter to all federal
prosecutors, which states, "in my view, the Emerson opinion, and the balance it strikes,
generally reflect the correct understanding of the Second Amendment"). For opinions on
the Ashcroft policy shift, see Jacob Sullum, Second Thoughts, REASON MAG. Aug. 1, 2002
available at http://reason.com/0208/ci.js.second.html. ("[Ashcroft's] position, even if
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, is not likely to have practical consequences anytime
soon."); Branch-Brioso, supra note 3 (quoting one legal historian's belief that the Justice
Department's policy shift will have more significance in the political area than in the
courts. Cf Sens. Edward M. Kennedy and Charles Schumer, Editorial, Ashcroft's Assault
on Gun Laws, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 2001 (stating that, "[aIll law-abiding
Americans should be deeply concerned about Ashcroft's efforts to . . . dramatically
reverse longstanding Justice Department measures to keep guns out of the hands of those
who pose the greatest risk to safety and security" and urging Ashcroft to "live up to the
commitments he made during his Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings");
Henigan, supra note 3 (arguing that "the department's position amounts to an invitation to
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led defendants like Freeman to question the dual role of the U.S.
Attorney's Office-a division of the DOJ- as employees of Ashcroft and
as prosecutors of weapons possession offenses. " 7
Even so, Freeman's motion to dismiss the indictment was denied by
D.C. Superior Court Judge Keary on the grounds that Sandidge provided
conclusive precedent."" Judge Keary explicitly stated that "Sandidge is
fully consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in 1939 in United States
v. Miller ... interpreting the Second Amendment as protecting only a
collective, rather than an individual right, to bear arms."" 9 Judge Keary's
denial further noted that the inconsistency between the Sandidge holding
and the position taken by the Department of Justice had no effect on the
force of that precedent.'20 Finally, the order pointed out that even if the
court adopted a collective rights interpretation of the Second
Amendment, the statutes were constitutional as applied to this
defendant, because, like the defendant in Emerson, he was a convicted
felon."' This denial, however, has not stopped Freeman from appealing
federal judges to decide for themselves whether a gun law under attack is sufficiently
'reasonable' . . . instead of deferring to the judgment of Congress or state legislatures");
Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence Submits an Opposition to Block Ashcroft Letter,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 16, 2001 (describing the Memorandum of Law filed by the
Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence in an attempt to prevent Ashcroft's letter from
being admitted in the Emerson case). The article stated:
The Educational Fund's Memorandum of Law demonstrates that the Attorney
General acted outside his statutory authority in issuing a legal opinion at all
because the law authorizes him to render legal opinions only to and at the
request of the President and certain other members of the executive branch ....
[E]ven when the Attorney General has been requested to render a legal opinion,
it is improper for the Attorney General to opine on an issue reserved to the
courts, such as proper interpretation of the Second Amendment.
Id.
117. United States v. Freeman, No. F-1048-02 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 11, 2002)
(reiterating the defendant's reliance on the Attorney General's memorandum and the
assertion in Freeman "that the United States now unequivocally interprets the Second
Amendment as an individual and personal right, rather than a collective right of states to
maintain militias, given the recent position taken by the Solicitor General and the
Attorney General").
118. Id. at 1, 3 (stating that Sandidge "is conclusive precedent in this jurisdiction and is
dispositive of defendant's instant constitutional challenge, as it involved the same statutes
challenged by defendant in this case").
119. Id. at 3-4.
120. Id. at 4 ("While there may be an inconsistency between the Court of Appeals'
holding in Sandidge and the position expressed recently by the United States Department
of Justice in Emerson, that inconsistency does not diminish in any way the binding
precedential force of the Court of Appeals Sandidge ruling on this court").
121. Id. (noting Freeman's prior legal infractions).
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the decision, nor has it deterred the more than two dozen similarly-
situated defendants following his lead.
1 2
III. INTERPRETING THE COURT'S SILENCE
Today's challengers to the District's gun laws have a large hurdle to
overcome. First, they must convince the D.C. Court of Appeals to
reconsider the Sandidge decision and its interpretation of Miller.123 If
successful at the appellate level, their petitions for certiorari to the
Supreme Court must demonstrate that the Miller decision was• • • 124
inconclusive. Although Justice McReynolds' unanimous opinion in
Miller succinctly stated the proposition that the right to bear arms only
belongs to those persons acting in reasonable relation to a well-regulated
militia, this reading has been disputed. 125  Gun lobbyists and individual
rights theorists have circulated an alternative theory.126 Subscribers to
this alternative believe that the Court's opinion in Miller holds that only
the weapons themselves must bear some reasonable relation to a well-
regulated militia-that there can be no restrictions on an individual's
127right to own any type of weapon that is currently of military value.
122. See Santana & Tucker, supra note 2.
123. See Henigan, supra note 3 (contemplating the consequences of cases that might
challenge D.C. firearm statutes and the potential arguments advanced by prosecutors).
124. See discussion infra Part III (assessing the scholarly opinion that the reason the
Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to a Second Amendment case since Miller is
because the Court believes Miller is dispositive on the issue).
125. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175, 178 (1939). Justice Douglas took no
part in the consideration or decision. Id. at 183; see also Halbrook, supra note 98 (arguing
that "[t]he test was not whether the person in possession of the arm was a member of a
formal militia unit, but whether the arm 'at this time' is 'ordinary military equipment' or
its use 'could' potentially assist in the common defense"); McCoskey, supra note 3, at 881
(illustrating how both sides have used Miller to support their interpretations of the Second
Amendment).
126. See e.g. Halbrook, supra note 98, at 76 (promulgating this theory and his
support -as counsel to the NRA-for the individual-rights view).
127. See generally, Hardaway, supra note 14, at 112. The article states:
There are two possible interpretations of this holding. The first is that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to bear arms to those who need such
arms in order to serve in the militia. The second is that every citizen has a right
to possess a weapon of the type used by a militia. Under this reasoning, Miller
grants an unrestricted right to possess weapons if these are ordinary military
equipment of the day. The first interpretation has been uniformly adopted by all
of the Circuit Courts. The second interpretation of Miller, though not adopted
by a single Circuit Court, has nevertheless been put forth by the Gun Lobby.
Id.; Brannon P. Denning and Glenn H. Reynolds, Enduring and Empowering: The Bill of
Rights in the Third Millennium: Telling Miller's Tale: A Reply to David Yassky, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 113, 117 (2002) (stating that the Court's rejection of the government's
collective rights argument further supported the contention that the Miller Court
"implicitly adopted an individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment"); see
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Although widely discouraged by the circuit courts, this theory
incredulously leads to the conclusion that every law-abiding U.S. citizen
has the right to keep and bear such military weapons as grenades and
bazookas-the interpretation after Emerson that the bearer must have
some relation to a militia is no longer an absolute. 
a
2
So, why does the Supreme Court refuse to resolve the question?
29
Arguably, the Supreme Court's reluctance to grant certiorari to any
Second Amendment case following Miller indicates the Court's
satisfaction with the circuits' interpretations of Miller.30 However, the
Court's refusal to hear the Emerson case-where the Fifth Circuit
also Kopel, supra note 14, at 106-08 (stating that the author of the Miller decision, Justice
McReynolds, was "arguably one of the worst Supreme Court Justices of the twentieth
century," that the decision "can plausibly be read to support either the Standard Model or
the State's Rights theory," and "does not foreclose either," and that were it the only guide
to the Second Amendment, "the individual right vs. government right argument might be
impossible to resolve conclusively").
128. See Hardaway, supra note 14, at 112-13 (suggesting that an individual-rights
interpretation of Miller, as adopted by the Emerson court, "would allow regulation of
private possession of any firearm that would not be of use in a militia ... such as shotguns,
Saturday Night Specials and antique guns," but not the regulation of private possession of
"useful military hardware such as bazookas, tanks, grenades, or small tactical weapons").
Cf. Halbrook, supra note 98, at 76 (arguing that the test set forth in Miller was correctly
interpreted by Judge Cummings in Emerson and by Attorney General Ashcroft in his
letter to the NRA).
129. For a recent case that scholars expected would raise the Second Amendment
question before the Supreme Court, see United States v. Bean, 89 F. Supp. 2d 828 (2000),
cert. granted, 534 U.S. 1112 (2002) (Mem.). Bean was a gun dealer who lost all right to
possess firearms after being convicted of a felony. Id. at 829-30. Bean later petitioned the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) for relief under an exception within
the statute which gave BATF the authority to reinstate such privileges where it was
determined that the felon was no longer a danger to society. Id. at 830. The BATF,
however, sent Bean notice that it would not grant his request due to the Congress's annual
budget appropriation bill, which provided that "none of the funds appropriated herein
shall be available to investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal firearms
disabilities under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)." Id. Bean then petitioned the district court, arguing
that BATF's denial was subject to judicial review. Id. Bean was granted relief by the
district court, and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. Tony Mauro, Second
Amendment Stays in Background in Gun Case, THE RECORDER, Oct. 17, 2002 at 3.
Although Bean never argued his case from a Second Amendment standpoint, typical
Second Amendment arguments appeared in some of the Supreme Court briefs, and many
were disappointed that the Second Amendment didn't "play at least a cameo role during
Supreme Court oral arguments." Id.
130. Hardaway, supra note 14, at 46. The article states:
As long as each circuit court is following Miller ... it may reasonably be argued
that there has been no need for the Court to accept certiorari because the law is
clear and the circuit courts are following it, and that it is highly improbable that
the Supreme Court would leave uncorrected nine circuit court interpretations of
such a high profile amendment of the Bill of Rights.
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disregarded the conventional interpretation of Miller-suggests that the
Court may willingly accept other interpretations.' This idea that Miller
has not definitively settled the issue is further manifested by some
interesting words penned by Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in
Printz v. United States, where he suggested that the Court may have a
chance to decide the issue at some point in the future.'
3 2
The Cases court addressed the question of why the Supreme Court has
remained silent all these years.'33 As Judge Woodbury wrote:
Considering the many variable factors bearing upon the
question it seems to us impossible to formulate any general test
by which to determine the limits imposed by the Second
Amendment but that each case under it, like cases under the
due process clause, must be decided on its own facts and the
line between what is and what is not a valid federal restriction
pricked out by decided cases falling on one side or the other of
the line.'"
In fact, the Cases court considered both whether the weapon used by
Cases was capable of military use and whether Cases himself was a
member of a military organization.13 Finding that the weapon may have
military use, but that the defendant was not related in any way to a
military organization, the court determined that the defendant possessed
the weapon for his own recreation.3 6 The court held, therefore, that the
Federal Firearms Act was constitutional as applied to that defendant. 37
If the members of the Supreme Court agree with Judge Woodbury's
words, the issue of whether the Second Amendment grants an individual
131. See McCoskey, supra note 3, at 889, 893-94. Although the court refused to review
the Emerson decision, the court may eventually grant certiorari in another case in order to
resolve the circuit split. Id. at 880. Additionally, McCoskey notes an unpredictable
outcome if the Court does grant certiorari. Id. at 894.
132. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938-39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring); see
also Kopel, supra note 14, at 121-25 (discussing Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in
Printz, and Thomas's belief that the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the individual
rights issue). See also McCoskey, supra note 3, at 894 (discussing the references made by
Judge Cummings and Judge Garwood to Justices Scalia and Thomas' writings favoring an
individual rights view). For the view of retired Chief Justice Warren Burger, see BBC
News, Analysis: What is the NRA? (Mar. 1, 2000) available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/332555.stm. (pointing out that the Second
Amendment "is the subject of one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word fraud,
on the American People by special interest groups that I have seen in my lifetime").
133. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942); see also discussion supra
Part lI.B1.
134. Cases, 131 F.2d at 922.
135. Id. at 922-23.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 923.
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or collective right to bear arms would never warrant decision; instead,
the issue would become moot.'38 If this is the case, the Supreme Court's
continued silence may acknowledge the need to evaluate these
challenges on a case-by-case basis and that both the individual rights and
the collective rights interpretations share some degree of validity.
39
For example, in 2001, legal scholars believed that Emerson would
provide "the catalyst that forces a final answer to the question of whether
or not there is an individual right to own a firearm.' 40 As one scholar
pointed out, "Emerson not only challenges the Supreme Court to decide
what the scope of the Second Amendment really is, but it also provides
guidance to the Supreme Court by listing the crucial topics necessary to
resolve this issue. 1 41 Yet, the Supreme Court declined the opportunity
to discuss these issues. 42 In fact, the defendant in Emerson joined the
138. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 273 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker, J.,
specially concurring) (suggesting that a decision regarding whether the right is collective
or individual is "of no legal consequence").
139. Id.
140. Wade Maxwell Rhyne, United States v. Emerson and the Second Amendment, 28
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505, 506 (2001) (predicting that if the Fifth Circuit upheld
Emerson, the conflict between the Fifth Circuit and the other circuits would warrant
review by the Supreme Court and a final determination of whether the Second
Amendment grants a collective or individual right); see also Jack Trachtenberg, Comment,
Federalism, Popular Sovereignty, and the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms: A
Structural Alternative to United States v. Emerson, 50 BUFFALO L. REV. 445, 481 (2002)
("[I]f the Court grants certiorari, it will likely be presented with the duty of resolving the
Circuit split on the meaning of the Amendment. The Court would have the opportunity
'to either enshrine or eliminate the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms."').
See generally Roger I. Roots, The Approaching Death of the Collective Right Theory of the
Second Amendment, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 71, 73 (2000) (arguing that the Emerson decision
would spark "embarrassing scrutiny" of the collective rights theory in the courts); Perez,
supra note 11, at 368-69 (also arguing that Emerson will force the Supreme Court to
resolve these neglected matters).
141. Perez, supra note 11, at 383-85. The author states:
First, the Supreme Court will have to undertake a thorough textual analysis of
the Second Amendment to devise its scope .... [T]he Supreme Court will have
to address the issue of why, if the framers had meant only to guarantee the rights
of states to have militias and of their militiamen to keep and bear arms, would
they word the Second Amendment as they did .... Secondly ... the Supreme
Court will have to discuss why James Madison introduced the right to keep and
bear arms amendment along with other amendments that he described as
protecting private and natural rights .... Thirdly, the Supreme Court will have
to discuss whether the anti-tyranny function of the Second Amendment has
become outdated.
Id. at 383-84.
142. Emerson v. United States, 536 U.S. 907 (2002) (denying certiorari without
comment); see also Council, supra note 99 (arguing that the Fifth Circuit's ruling "left both
sides of the political spectrum claiming victory" because the decision acknowledged both
an individual right and the legislative ability to limit that right).
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ranks of parties in at least nine other circuit court cases that petitioned
the Court to decide the issue definitively and were denied review.'43
Emerson, however, was in a different posture than the other cases,
because it created a split between the circuits by interpreting the Second
Amendment as a shield for individual rights. 44  Typically, a "conflict
between circuit courts," a "federal circuit departure from [the] usual
course of judicial proceedings," "important federal questions that have
not been decided by the Supreme Court" or federal questions that
conflict with the Supreme Court form the criteria for granting
certiorari.145  Emerson presented these issues; nevertheless, the Court
refused to hear it.14  This leads to the question: what issues would a
Second Amendment case have to present in order to get the High
Court's attention?
147
IV. THE FUTILITY OF FINDING A "POSTER-BOY"
Robert A. Levy, a senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato
Institute, has repeatedly predicted that Michael Freeman's case may end
up before the Supreme Court.148 However, as Levy points out, Freeman
is more "a poster boy for gun control" than a poster boy for the
individual rights view of the Second Amendment. 149  Even Attorney
General John Ashcroft would presumably agree that disallowing
convicted felons the right to bear weapons is a reasonable restriction; and
such a finding would surely be consistent even with the approach taken
by the Fifth Circuit in Emerson.
50
143. See Hardaway, supra note 14, at 46 (reciting the argument that the reason the
Court had previously denied certiorari in those cases was because the Court believed that
the circuits were correct in rejecting an individual rights theory).
144. See discussion supra Part II.B.6.
145. Hardaway, supra note 14, at 47-48. In the article, the authors speculate on the
reasons why the Supreme Court has refused "to resolve one of the most contentious
constitutional debates of all time." Id. at 48.
146. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907
(2002) (refusing, without comment, to grant certiorari).
147. See discussion infra Part IV.
148. Levy, supra note 15. Levy states, "Michael Freeman is probably a bad dude...
Most likely, Freeman never imagined that he'd become a constitutional test case. Yet his
Second Amendment claim could end up before the Supreme Court." Id.
149. Id. (acknowledging Freeman as an unsympathetic defendant). But see Santana &
Tucker, supra note 2 (noting that another defendant, Bashaun Pearson, who has appealed
his case to the D.C. Court of Appeals, has a more unique case because he was arrested
only on the gun charge).
150. See Letter from John Ashcroft, supra note 1, at n.1 ("Of course, the individual
rights view of the Second Amendment dos [sic] not prohibit Congress from enacting laws
restricting firearms ownership for compelling state interests, such as prohibiting firearms
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Levy, however, puts forth a more intriguing hypothetical-what if
members of pro-gun groups organized "a peaceful demonstration in the
nation's capital by responsible, armed citizens volunteering to be
arrested for handgun possession?"'51  If law-abiding, upstanding D.C.
citizens with no prior records were arrested for brandishing their pistols
on the Capitol lawn, and then challenged the D.C. gun laws as
unconstitutional, would the Supreme Court be more likely to hear their
case?'52
As Levy notes, the D.C. statute is more ripe for constitutional
challenge than those of other states."' First, D.C. law restricts gun
ownership to law enforcement officials.54 Second, due to D.C.'s unique
status, it is subject to the Second Amendment in a manner similar to the
Federal government.'55 Finally, Levy contends that because the D.C.
U.S. Attorney's Office prosecutes violators of these weapons statutes, an
office under the control of the Attorney General, John Ashcroft can no
longer allow the U.S. Attorneys' Offices to "prosecute infractions of a
law that the Department of Justice deems to be unconstitutional."'5 6
ownership by convicted felons, just as the First Amendment does not prohibit shouting
'fire' in a crowded movie theater.").
151. Levy, Will Individuals Get Their Second Amendment Rights?, supra note 15
(planting the idea in the heads of pro-gun group members in order to produce "more-
sympathetic litigants," and "validate the Justice Department's newly announced
position").
152. Id.; see also Halbrook, supra note 98 (noting that "[n]o federal court has ever
upheld a general prohibition by law-abiding citizens of firearms"); Henigan, supra note 3.
Henigan states:
The defendant in Freeman was a convicted felon, making it easy for the
government to argue that his gun possession would not be protected even under
the broad individual rights view. But for illegal possession cases not involving
convicted felons, the government's concession of a broad individual right may
have a materially adverse impact.
Id.
153. Levy, Will Individuals Get Their Second Amendment Rights?, supra note 15
(outlining the reasons for the D.C. law's susceptibility to challenge).
154. Id. Levy notes that "the law applies not just to 'unfit' persons like felons, minors,
or the mentally incompetent, but across the board to ordinary, honest, responsible
citizens." Id. Levy further contends that a handgun, unlike the sawed-off shotgun in
Emerson or the machine gun in Haney, is a personal weapon used for an individual's self-
defense. Id.
155. Id. Cf Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057, 1059 (D.C. App. 1987)
(Nebeker, J., concurring) (stating his conclusion that "the [S]econd [A]mendment does
not apply to the seat of national government .... Nothing suggests that the founders were
concerned about 'free territories,' 'free protectorates,' or a 'free Seat of Government of
the United States."').
156. Levy, Will Individuals Get Their Second Amendment Rights?, supra note 15.
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Still, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in these
cases." 7 The Supreme Court's reluctance to unequivocally state whether
the Second Amendment grants an individual or collective right to bear
arms is not because the issue is too hot.'58 The Second Amendment's
right to bear arms surely is not as controversial as abortion or
segregation. 9 The Court is not reluctant because it is overly burdened
by other more important cases, nor is it is unwilling because it fears
opening the floodgates of Second Amendment litigation; such concerns
have not hampered the Court on other controversial issues. 60 Judging by
their individual records, it is doubtful that the Court members fear their
own personal integrity might be attacked if they favor either a collective
or individual right; it is equally doubtful that they would hesitate to
address the issue until they can ensure each other's ruling. 16' Nor does
the contention that they are unwilling to end the debate result from a
belief that Miller was conclusive on the issue. 62
Instead, as Judge Woodbury suggested in Cases, the Supreme Court
has made a conscious choice to leave the determination of reasonable
regulations under the Second Amendment to the triers of fact. 6  The
question of whether the right is individual or collective holds limited
legal value; courts may decide each case in terms of whether the statute
in question reasonably regulates the right without deciding whether that
right is individual or collective.' 64 Few would argue that it was the
157. See discussion infra Part IV.
158. Hardaway, supra note 14, at 48 (referring to the Second Amendment issue as a
"proverbial legal 'hot potato').
159. Id. at 49 (concluding that "[t]he notion that the High Court is simply too timid to
resolve a contentious legal issue is ... distinctly unsatisfying, given that the settlement of
such issues is one of the primary reasons for the very existence of the High Court").
160. Id. at 49-50 (comparing the Second Amendment issue to school prayer and
abortion).
161. Id. at 49-51. The authors examine the Court's prior decisions in the face of past
controversial situations and argue that "the Court has an admirable record of courage in
deciding issues of great concern, and providing leadership where the legislative bodies
have been timid."
162. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937-39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(suggesting that he would welcome the opportunity to determine whether the Second
Amendment granted an individual or collective right).
163. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) (suggesting that it is
not the role of the federal courts to speculate on whether the Second Amendment grants
an individual or collective right, where the determination of a specific case does not
depend on such a discussion).
164. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 273 (5th Cir. 2002) (Parker, J.,
specially concurring).
The real issue, however, is the fact that whatever the nature or parameters of the
Second Amendment right, be it collective or individual, it is a right subject to
reasonable regulation. The debate, therefore, over the nature of the right, is
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Framers' desire to authorize every United States citizen to own a nuclear
warhead, and few would argue for permitting only law enforcement
officers to possess a hunting rifle. 65 Consequently, the line between an
individual right subject to reasonable restrictions and a collective right
subject to a reasonable relation to a militia becomes blurred.' 66 Each case
must be decided on an individual basis, with each court deciding the
constitutionality of the law as applied to the defendant before it.
167
V. CONCLUSION
With Emerson, the theory that the Second Amendment grants an
individual right to bear arms has moved out of the world of academic
inquiry and into the judiciary. Many legal scholars therefore have
predicted a definitive declaration from the High Court in the nearf 16917
future. This contention, however, is likely without merit. 17  The
Supreme Court's unwillingness to explicitly state whether the right is
individual or collective is not a measure of avoidance, but a conscious
decision to "avoid constitutional questions when the outcome of the case
does not turn on how [they] answer.' 171 It is unlikely, moreover, that a
misplaced. In the final analysis, whether the right to keep and bear arms is
collective or individual is of no legal consequence.
Id.
165. Id. (stating that "no responsible individual or organization would suggest" that
the Second Amendment protects the right of Emerson or any other defendant to possess
every type of weapon created or supercedes the rights of "others to be free from bodily
harm or threats of harm").
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Branch-Brioso, supra note 3 (finding that the majority of Second
Amendment scholarship promulgates the individual-rights view, but noting that a large
percentage of such writings were authored by the NRA's lead lawyer, Stephen Halbrook);
see also Yassky, supra note 3, at 190-91 (1999) (arguing that the federal District Court in
Texas relied on the views advanced by individual-rights scholars in deciding United States
v. Emerson); Henigan, supra note 3 (stating that "[t]here is no doubt that Second
Amendment challenges to gun laws will now become a standard part of the criminal
defense attorney's tool kit").
169. See, e.g., Tucker & Santana, D.C. Handgun Ban Challenged, supra note 4 (stating
that "the District is a logical place for the interpretation to be tested"); Levy, Will
Individuals Get Their Second Amendment Rights?, supra note 4 (examining the factors
which make D.C. gun laws so ripe for constitutional challenge). Cf. Gregory L. Poe,
Caught in the Crossfire: Gun Control and the Second Amendment, Panel Discussion
presented by the Washington Council of Lawyers, Oct. 23, 2002 (stating his view that gun
advocates will want to delay bringing a valid test case before the Supreme Court until a
new justice with an individual rights view gets appointed and that this type of litigation is
not going anywhere right now on the federal level).
170. See discussion infra Part IV.
171. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 272 (5th Cir. 2002) (Parker, J., specially
concurring) (quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)).
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test case will emerge that hinges so completely on the Court's resolution
of this issue.' As a result, in spite of the fact that new challenges to the
Second Amendment may be more plentiful, especially in the District of
Columbia, there is little likelihood that any of those challenges will
resolve this age-old debate.'73
"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality
... unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323
U.S. at 105 (1944). Judge Parker, ironically, quotes Judge Garwood's concurring opinion
in Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1356 (5th Cir. 1994) (Garwood, J., concurring
specially), which stated that, "[it is settled that courts have a strong duty to avoid
constitutional issues that need not be resolved in order to determine the rights of the
parties to the case under consideration." Id.
172. For possible prediction of what the ideal test case might look like, see Levy, supra
note 4 (suggesting that if law-abiding citizens challenged their inability to obtain a lawful
license to carry a handgun in the District, they may find more success); see also Stephen P.
Halbrook, Caught in the Crossfire: Gun Control and the Second Amendment, Panel
Discussion presented by the Washington Council of Lawyers Oct. 23, 2002 (suggesting that
the ideal test case would have been a case in Texas challenging the application of the Gun
Free Schools Act to home schools; that case, however, was dismissed for want of
prosecution).
173. See discussion supra Part IV.
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